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US intelligence warned of the potential for violence days before Hamas attack – CNN


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What’s Next After Hamas’ Attack on Israel? – United States Institute of Peace


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  United States Institute of Peace


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@mikenov: A series of coordinated attacks, led by Hamas, from the Gaza Strip into bordering areas in Israel, commenced on 7 October 2023, a Sabbath day – W 2023 Hamas attack on Israel Google – https://t.co/iiZAJNnyzt Bing



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What Will Happen In Gaza After Israel Stops Its War On Hamas?


What Will Happen In Gaza After Israel Stops Its War On Hamas?

Israel’s goal is to eradicate Hamas and secure the enclave.

As Israel has waged its war in the Gaza Strip, officials across the world are united in trying to figure out how to restore order when all the fighting stops. There’s little agreement, however, and even less optimism.

Israel’s goal is to eradicate Hamas and secure the enclave.  But like so much about the events of the Palestinian militant group’s Oct. 7 attack on the Jewish state and its aftermath, what advocates seek for the future of Gaza reflects how they interpret the past — and on that, they can’t agree.

That raises questions over whether Israel can ever achieve its stated aims: to deradicalize and demilitarize the Palestinian territory of 2.2 million people on its southwestern border. Israel and Hamas agreed a hostage deal announced early Wednesday and a pause in fighting, but it’s uncertain whether any sustainable peace will endure.

US President Joe Biden wants to bring the more moderate Palestinian Authority from the West Bank, led by Mahmoud Abbas, back into Gaza more than 16 years after it was ejected and restart the building of a Palestinian state, as he laid out in a recent essay and public statements.

Interviews with two dozen officials, diplomats and analysts in Israel, the Arab world, Europe and the US — most of which were granted on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive negotiations — show the range of options along with the mistrust and confusion dominating the discussions.

Unlike the US, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opposes a Palestinian state and wants to keep the West Bank and Gaza separate. It seeks to foster a young technocratic leadership inside Gaza with Arab money, US guidance and Israeli security that will build something like Dubai on the Mediterranean, according to senior Israeli officials and others with whom they’ve spoken. It’s an approach most outsiders consider pie in the sky.

The Palestinian Authority says it won’t discuss the future without a ceasefire, but privately officials say they’re ready to return, just not on the back of Israeli tanks. The European Union supports its return, one senior official said, and could beef up its border control mission in Gaza that was withdrawn after Oct. 7. Top officials from the EU have been holding discussions with officials from the authority and key Arab states.

Some other European and US officials say the only way forward is a multinational or United Nations force, with an emphasis on Arab troops. Governments in Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia say they won’t put boots on the ground and that the US is too supportive of Israel’s war.

“Let me be very clear: I know I am speaking on behalf of Jordan but I have discussed this issue with almost all of our Arab brethren,” Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi told the Manama Dialogue security conference in Bahrain on Nov. 18. “There will be no Arab troops going to Gaza.”

That leaves an option of a force like the one in Haiti or Lebanon, but these are considered to be highly ineffective, and Israel either won’t accept it or will mostly ignore it once in place.

Many Arabs see the Hamas attack last month as evidence that Israel has been ignoring the Palestinian question to its detriment, pursuing peace with countries further afield such as the United Arab Emirates, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. The assault was significant less for its savagery than for the underlying factors that, they argue, drove desperate people to do desperate things.

An Israeli flag amongst vehicles destroyed in the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas militants, collected in an area near the Gaza border, outside Netivot, southern Israel, on Friday, Nov. 17, 2023.

An Israeli flag amongst vehicles destroyed in the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas militants, collected in an area near the Gaza border, outside Netivot, southern Israel, on Friday, Nov. 17, 2023.

This is an opportunity, they say, to restart stalled Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and return to the two-state model that has animated policy and analysis for some three decades. Some also argue that Hamas can’t be eliminated because the group, designated a terrorist organization by the US, UK and EU, is inherent to Palestinian society and now must be incorporated into peace talks.

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Israelis mostly draw a different conclusion. They say they pulled their forces and settlers out of Gaza in 2005. Palestinians could have constructed factories, farms and hotels. Instead, Hamas — which won legislative elections a year later and then took control by force — mostly built rockets and underground tunnels, training thousands of militants to kill and maim, while leaving the population impoverished, the Israelis say.

The lesson is that Israel must never again leave neighboring territory in the hands of Palestinian security forces because militants will take over and try another Oct. 7 attack. For them, the model is Japan and Germany after World War II — destroy fully the existing authority and create a new entity backed by an aid package.

“The only way to uproot Hamas entails a massive devastation to homes and infrastructure, leaving parts of Gaza today looking like the European cities in rubble at the end of the Second World War,” said Uri Dromi, an Israeli government spokesman in the 1990s. “The situation calls for a similar remedy: A new Marshall Plan for Gaza.”

Palestinians search for casualties in the crater of a building destroyed by an Israeli strike in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Saturday, Nov. 18, 2023. While

Palestinians search for casualties in the crater of a building destroyed by an Israeli strike in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Saturday, Nov. 18, 2023. While

A scenario of total devastation in Gaza risks radicalizing an entire generation of youth against the Jewish state, Arab leaders like Jordan’s King Abdullah have warned. Plus, it would involve billions, if not tens of billions, of dollars. The question is from whom and who would decide how to spend it. Qatar, for one, has financed Gaza for years, with money going toward infrastructure.

Some Arab leaders, though, say they’ve paid to rebuild Gaza three times already due to conflicts with Israel and aren’t much interested in a fourth without rock-solid guarantees.

In Israel, many say it’s time to abandon the — clearly failed — two-state formula and find a new approach. “It’s as if nothing happened and people are coming up with the old stuff,” said Uzi Rabi, director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. “I would vie for something which is out-of-the-box thinking. There is an opportunity to do something different.”

Biden says that ground rules for what should happen next include no forcible displacement of Palestinians, no siege or blockade of Gaza and no reduction in its territory.

But Israel has been pressing to move Gazans temporarily into Egypt or other Arab countries to complete its military operation and limit civilian casualties. Egypt refuses — as do the others — on the grounds that, in the past, Israel drove Palestinians from their homes and may not let them back. Israel denies that, but says it plans to create a buffer zone inside Gaza so that militants are kept far from its communities. That, too, contradicts Biden.

Palestinians with dual citizenship while seeking permission to leave Gaza at the Rafah border crossing into Egypt in Rafah, Gaza, on Wednesday, Nov. 1, 2023.

Palestinians with dual citizenship while seeking permission to leave Gaza at the Rafah border crossing into Egypt in Rafah, Gaza, on Wednesday, Nov. 1, 2023.

In trying to plan what’s next, many look at recent history. The Palestinian Authority was in charge of Gaza from 1994 until 2007. In 2006 legislative elections, Hamas squeaked past Fatah, the main party of the Palestinian Authority. It then began pressuring Fatah officials, leading to a violent civil war. Hundreds were killed and the Palestinian Authority was exiled from the strip.

Walid Ibrahim al-Walid, a general in the Palestinian Authority’s preventive security service, counts himself lucky to be alive. He says Hamas made two attempts on his life in Gaza. “They came to my house, where I was with my family, and began shooting and throwing grenades,” he recounted.

Now living in the West Bank, Al-Walid would like to go back to Gaza, where he’s from, as part of a new leadership. There are some 25,000 Palestinian Authority officials still in Gaza, some of whom work within Hamas ministries, and others who’ve collected salaries for 16 years while staying home. Such civil servants could, in theory, form a new governing structure.

Two names come up as possibilities to run Gaza, at least in the short term. One is Mohammed Dahlan, the top Palestinian Authority figure in Gaza before Hamas took over. Dahlan challenged President Abbas and has been living in exile in Abu Dhabi since 2011. The other is Marwan Barghouti. He’s been in Israeli prison for two decades, is highly influential in the West Bank and considered a possible successor to Abbas. Israel would have to be willing to release him.

The Palestinian Authority, though, is widely considered to have grown sclerotic after almost two decades under Abbas, with corruption and inefficiency endemic. Israeli officials say the authority’s return would be a recipe for disaster and they won’t permit it. US officials don’t deny that there are significant problems with that possibility, but say they’re less severe than Israel contends.

In truth, there are so many variables — when the war will end, how much will be left standing, how many civilians are killed, whether the fighting spreads more deeply into Lebanon — that detailed planning seems almost fantasy-like. It isn’t even clear who the decision makers in key places will be.

Many expect that when the war ends, Netanyahu will be forced to resign for having overseen the security lapse that permitted the Oct. 7 attack. Since his government is especially nationalist, a change could mean a new approach.

It’s far from clear, however, whether a new administration would be more moderate on Gaza’s future or a Palestinian state because the events of recent weeks have driven many Israelis further to the right. In a poll by Channel 12 last week, only 10% of Israelis said they favored bringing the Palestinian Authority into Gaza, with 30% favoring an international force.

It’s also not clear how much longer Abbas, 88, will be in office or who might replace him. The same could be said of Biden at 81, facing a tight reelection race in one year, possibly against Donald Trump, who’s campaigning partly on a platform of isolationism, suggesting that US military engagement abroad would decrease markedly.

Biden has taken a central role in supporting Israel, sending two carrier-led combat fleets to the Eastern Mediterranean to warn Hezbollah and Iran not to jump into the war with Israel.

Among many other issues is what will be left of Gaza. Much of Gaza City is in ruins. Gaza’s inhabitants are mostly the descendants of refugees and many have lived without productive work, although thanks to UN agencies, their core needs — health and education — have been met.

Displaced Palestinians carry bedding materials at a camp, operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA), in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Sunday, Nov. 19, 2023.

Displaced Palestinians carry bedding materials at a camp, operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA), in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Sunday, Nov. 19, 2023.

The reputation of the strip is more dire than the reality. According to the World Bank, Gaza has near universal literacy, much higher than in neighboring Egypt, let alone poorer countries like Sudan and Chad. Rates of infant mortality and life expectancy were also better.  

But the impact of the war will be devastating. The UN Development Program has already forecast that with some 390,000 jobs lost so far, the economy could shrink by up to 12% in 2023, poverty could rise by a third and the area could be set back by some 15 years. More than two thirds of Gazans have been displaced. Gaza could look like Syria with huge internal refugee tent camps amid rubble.

“It’s extremely difficult to think of the endgame,” said Khaled Al-Hroub, professor in residence of the faculty of liberal arts at Northwestern University in Qatar. “Much depends on the final outcome of the war and the degree to which Hamas is weakened.”

He said Hamas can’t be eliminated and must be included in negotiations on a future Palestinian state, or as former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa put it: “Hamas will most certainly have a role in what emerges after the guns are silenced.”

Displaced Palestinians build a structure for a temporary shelter at a camp, operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA), in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Sunday, Nov. 19, 2023.

Displaced Palestinians build a structure for a temporary shelter at a camp, operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA), in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Sunday, Nov. 19, 2023.

Meanwhile, said Al-Hroub, Israel is turning Gaza into a “reconstruction site that will consume whoever is in power for years to come in healing it.” And, for now, it’s hard to see who would wield that power beyond Israel.

The country says it trusts no one else to make sure Hamas isn’t rebuilding its forces. It plans on having its troops moving freely in and out, which will protect the border communities it plans to rebuild, but create friction in Gaza.

If a local governing body does emerge, the situation might most resemble parts of the West Bank where Palestinian officials handle civil matters and Israeli troops are responsible for security. It’s an arrangement that Palestinians have complained about for years, saying Israeli troops humiliate their officials who are dismissed by the population as toadies and agents of occupation.

Meanwhile, the most striking gap remains over the meaning of Oct. 7. Israelis focus on the killing, maiming and kidnapping of women, children and elderly, by militants. To them, it’s evidence of a deeply violent streak and proof that Hamas needs to be uprooted the way the Islamic State was from Iraq and Syria in 2016-17.

Posters of Israeli hostages during a demonstration calling for their release outside the Knesset in Jerusalem on Nov. 7.

Posters of Israeli hostages during a demonstration calling for their release outside the Knesset in Jerusalem on Nov. 7.

Palestinians view it differently. They tend to see the attack as a triumph over Israel, according to a recent poll by Ramallah-based Arab World for Research and Development. Support for a two-state solution has plummeted, it showed, while belief has soared in the installation of a Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.

To the question of whether the events since Oct. 7 have made them more or less in favor of coexistence, nine in 10 Palestinians said less.

That’s the kind of sentiment Israelis cite as a reason to focus purely on their own security calculations, without expecting cooperation from anyone else. “As long as there is no stability in Gaza, Israel can rely on nobody,” said Rabi, the Dayan Center director. “Whatever the solution, it has to have something to do with the security needs of Israel.”

(This story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)


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@mikenov: 6:36 AM 11/22/2023 – Russia Is the Loser in the Israel-Hamas War ,,, As Hamas Visits Its ‘Closest Friend’ Moscow, Questions Surround Russia’s Knowledge Of, Involvement In October 7 Hamas Attack: A Review Of Russia-Hamas Ties and Strategic Relationship … Escalating violence in… https://t.co/LMaKgnGns4



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6:36 AM 11/22/2023 – Russia Is the Loser in the Israel-Hamas War ,,, As Hamas Visits Its ‘Closest Friend’ Moscow, Questions Surround Russia’s Knowledge Of, Involvement In October 7 Hamas Attack: A Review Of Russia-Hamas Ties and Strategic Relationship … Escalating violence in Gaza increasing chatter of possible terror attack in New York, intelligence report says … What Will Happen In Gaza After Israel Stops Its War On Hamas? … US said to delay shipment of weapons for security squads due to Ben Gvir’s conduct


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Russia Is the Loser in the Israel-Hamas War ,,,  As Hamas Visits Its ‘Closest Friend’ Moscow, Questions Surround Russia’s Knowledge Of, Involvement In October 7 Hamas Attack: A Review Of Russia-Hamas Ties and Strategic Relationship … Escalating violence in Gaza increasing chatter of possible terror attack in New York, intelligence report says … What Will Happen In Gaza After Israel Stops Its War On Hamas? … US said to delay shipment of weapons for security squads due to Ben Gvir’s conduct

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In the fall of 2012, I took part in an open discussion at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on Russia’s role in the Middle East. In her presentation, an experienced American diplomat focused on how Russia was a spent force that would never be able to recapture the Soviet Union’s prominence in the region. With few dissenting voices, the discussion was remarkable for how off-base it was: It was exactly then that Moscow was starting to reemerge as a major player in Syria and across the entire region.

In the fall of 2012, I took part in an open discussion at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on Russia’s role in the Middle East. In her presentation, an experienced American diplomat focused on how Russia was a spent force that would never be able to recapture the Soviet Union’s prominence in the region. With few dissenting voices, the discussion was remarkable for how off-base it was: It was exactly then that Moscow was starting to reemerge as a major player in Syria and across the entire region.

Today, Russia’s influence in the Middle East is at another inflection point. Hobbled by its disastrous invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s declining relevance in the region has been thrown into sharp relief by Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel. Whereas Moscow was central to the diplomacy surrounding the civil war in Syria 10 years ago, Russia’s push in the U.N. Security Council for a cease-fire in Gaza gained little traction. The contrast is emblematic for the end of Moscow’s decade-long comeback in the region.

Even before regaining the Russian presidency in May 2012, Vladimir Putin was determined to return Russia to a prominent role in the Middle East, which he likely believed was necessary for Russia to be a great power. Criticizing then-President Dmitry Medvedev’s decision to abstain on the U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in Libya, which Putin likened to the medieval crusades, he appeared bent on preventing the West from ever having a free hand again. And as the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011 and intensified in 2012, the Kremlin took a hard line opposing any U.N. action, fearing a replay of events in Libya.

It was amid the Syrian war that Moscow charted its course to renewed significance in the Middle East. Putin made his first major move there in September 2013. With the United States preparing for an armed intervention after the Syrian regime crossed the “red line” publicly announced by then-President Barack Obama and used chemical weapons on its own people, Putin devised a diplomatic compromise, whereby Russia promised to help eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal.

Two years later, Russia cemented its renewed position in the region by militarily intervening in Syria. In less than a year, Moscow’s forces turned the tide of the war and secured Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s rule—a success Putin would parlay into influence across the region. With its firm hold in Syria, Russia became central to regional diplomacy from Ankara to Riyadh to Cairo. Working with Iran and Hezbollah on the battlefield in Syria, Moscow’s relations with Tehran began to warm. Forced to take account of Russian military forces next door—especially the Russian air defense units that could potentially ground the Israeli air force—Israel increasingly engaged Moscow. Iraq and Egypt sought Russian intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation. Soon, Russia-backed forces began to arrive in Libya to intervene in that civil war as well.

Moscow used its new entree in the region to posture itself as an alternative to the United States, leveraging discontent with Washington to boost its influence. In Turkey, Moscow capitalized on perceptions of Western support for the failed coup against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2016 as well as persistent clashes over U.S. cooperation with Kurdish forces in Syria that Ankara considers terrorist groups. In Egypt, Putin used the Obama administration’s concerns after the overthrow of the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood-led government by the Egyptian military in 2013 to develop warm relations with new Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. In Israel, Putin took advantage of the icy relationship between Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to further boost ties with Israel. In Saudi Arabia, Putin made an early bet on the ambitious crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, demonstratively shaking his hand at the G-20 summit in 2018, just a month after journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by Saudi government operatives.

Moscow’s interest-based approach and skillful diplomacy helped it successfully navigate regional cleavages. Russian policy has been pragmatic and even cynical, unmoored to ideology or values such as democracy. Russia was able to simultaneously improve ties with Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. It managed to engage the Turkish government and Kurdish groups in Syria, deftly avoiding the criticisms that Ankara levied at Washington.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, however, initiated a gradual unraveling of the Kremlin’s influence in the Middle East. First, Russia’s unprovoked attack tarnished its international standing, making it a less appealing alternative to play off against Washington. Cairo, for example, facing pressure from Washington, agreed to halt planned shipments of weapons to Russia that would have supported its war in Ukraine. Ankara has reportedly eschewed purchasing another batch of Russia’s S-400 air defense system, likely concluding that playing the Russia card with Washington is now less credible and effective.

Moscow’s leverage in its relationships with key states in the region has also been reversed. Whereas Russia was able to impose painful sanctions on Turkey in response to the latter’s downing of a Russian fighter jet in 2015 and eventually force Erdogan to apologize, Russia is now reliant on Turkey as a conduit for the transshipment of goods to circumvent Western sanctions. Russian aircraft are now routed through Istanbul and Dubai to avoid European airspace restrictions. Moscow is buying Iranian-made armed drones and even building a factory to produce Iran-licensed drones in Russia.

Finally, Moscow has weakened its military and security presence in the Middle East. While Russia still maintains a key naval and air base in Syria, it has reduced some of its forces and equipment there to support military operations in Ukraine. To feed its struggling war machine, Russia has even recruited Syrian fighters. Although Russia maintains a presence in Libya through what was the Wagner paramilitary group, it has reportedly also redeployed forces from the group to help fight in Ukraine. Russia’s ability to project power in the region is also hamstrung by the fact that Moscow would be hard-pressed to reinforce its presence in a crisis or should its forces there be challenged, given Russia’s commitments in Ukraine.

Hamas’s vicious attack against Israeli civilians and Israel’s sharp response are likely to mark a point of no return for Russia’s waning influence in the Middle East. Russia-Israel ties had already been strained by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but Putin’s response to the crisis in Gaza has likely made things worse. Blaming U.S. policy, Moscow has refrained from explicitly condemning Hamas’s attack. Moscow’s reticence to weigh in on Israel’s side has not gone unnoticed, with a politician from Netanyahu’s party going on Russian state TV to lambaste Russia’s response. While Putin has likely damaged his personal ties with Netanyahu, bilateral relations would likely deteriorate even further if the latter were to leave office as a result of the crisis in Gaza.

Moscow’s past importance as a mediator among Palestinian groups is also likely to dissipate. Russia has refrained from recognizing Hamas as a terrorist group and sought to facilitate reconciliation among Palestinian groups as a key step toward peace and the creation of a Palestinian state. Hamas officials have visited Moscow several times during the past decade, including just last month. But even if Hamas manages to survive Israel’s ongoing ground invasion of Gaza, intra-Palestinian reconciliation may not be a priority for the Middle East peace process in the foreseeable future.

The Israel-Hamas war is also likely to make it more difficult for Russia to navigate regional rivalries, particularly given its warming ties with Tehran. While Moscow would probably prefer to avoid picking a side between Israel and Iran, attempts to maintain neutrality amid sharpening conflict would probably just create friction with both. If forced to choose, Moscow would probably decide based on its view of the impact on the war in Ukraine, the frame through which Putin is viewing all international challenges now. The Kremlin would need to decide whether Iranian weapons are more critical for Russia—or whether the priority is maintaining influence with Israel in order to dissuade it from providing arms to Ukraine.

An escalation of the crisis to a broader regional fight directly involving Iran—which seems unlikely now but remains possible—would make Russia’s impotence obvious to all. Despite its bases in Syria, Russia’s military presence is insufficient to shape events. When challenged in the past, Russia has chosen to back down, as it did in 2018 when the United States launched punitive airstrikes against Syrian targets. Russia simply does not have the leverage to forge a compromise or lead negotiations. Even with states with which Moscow has good relations—Iran and Saudi Arabia—it was Beijing that brokered the normalization of relations between the two.

Certainly, the Israel-Hamas war is a welcome development for Moscow, distracting international attention from Russia’s own war in Ukraine and potentially forcing the United States to make decisions about prioritizing security assistance to Israel or Ukraine. Washington’s full-throated support for Israeli military operations has also created some uncomfortable comparisons with Russia’s own attacks in Ukraine. But Washington’s own-goals with the Arab world or the broader global south do not necessarily accrue to Moscow’s account.

Ultimately, the crisis precipitated by Hamas’s large-scale attack on Israel could help determine the future of the Middle East. Moscow, however, is unlikely to have much of a role in shaping it—if it has any at all. There is not likely to be another Madrid Conference. Whereas Russia was central to the discussions around the Syrian civil war a decade ago, the future trajectory of the Middle East is likely to emerge from the Gaza crisis without any significant input from Moscow.

newyork

By Marcia Kramer

Updated on: November 20, 2023 / 5:15 PM EST / CBS New York

NEW YORK — CBS News learned Monday of increased threats of a possible terror attack in New York City as a direct result of the escalating violence in the Middle East

Gov. Kathy Hochul is already taking action to beef up security and increase staffing of the Joint Terrorism Task Force following a new threat assessment by the New York State Intelligence Center that violence in Gaza is driving chatter about targets in New York

“I am working hard at the state level with the control I have. I’ll be talking about this tomorrow, about exactly what we’re doing, and how many online threats we’ve uncovered, how many have been investigated, what the outcome is,” said Hochul. 

The governor spoke about new steps she’ll be taking to deal with online threats and radicalization, even as CBS News obtained a new threat assessment which points to “an increasing terror threat to NYS.” 

The intelligence center warned that the spread of antisemitic and anti-Palestinian rhetoric on social media is fueling an increase in hate crimes targeting Jews, Muslims and Arabs. 

“The expansion of Israeli operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip and increase in civilian casualties raises the likelihood that violent extremist threat actors will seek to conduct attacks against targets in the West, with New York State being a focus. Terrorist messaging has placed focus on attacking ‘soft targets’ such as protests, group gatherings, and other public events,” the report said. 

Last week, Hochul earmarked $2.5 million to add additional State Police investigators to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York City, Albany, Buffalo and Rochester. 

“We are working with all law enforcement, federal, state, and local, statewide. These are not just New York City events,” said Hochul. 

“Our most immediate concern is that violent extremists, individuals or small groups, will draw inspiration from the events in the Middle East to carry out attacks against Americans going about their daily lives,” said FBI Director Christopher Wray. “That includes not just homegrown violent extremists, inspired by a foreign terrorist organization, but also domestic violent extremists targeting Jewish or Muslim communities. We’ve already seen that with the individual we arrested last week in Houston.” 

The number of bias incidents investigated by the NYPD Hate Crime Task Force increased by 124% in October, led by a 214% spike in anti-Jewish incidents.

Marcia Kramer

marcia-kramer-small-2020.png

Marcia Kramer joined CBS2 in 1990 as an investigative and political reporter. Prior to CBS2, she was the City Hall bureau chief at the New York Daily News.

First published on November 20, 2023 / 4:46 PM EST

© 2023 CBS Broadcasting Inc. All Rights Reserved.

What Will Happen In Gaza After Israel Stops Its War On Hamas?  NDTV

Introduction

Hamas’s surprise October 7, 2023 terror attack, in which over 1,400 were brutally murdered and another 241 (at last count) taken hostage, will go down in infamy. As Hamas leader abroad Khaled Mashal boasted on October 26 on Egypt’s Sada Elbalad TV, the Russians told him that this attack would be taught in military academies.[1]

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, everyone, including military experts on TV, were quick to comment on its primitivity, pointing to the use of bulldozers, trucks, and motorcycles to break through the border barrier,[2] and the use of motorized paragliders to bring in terrorists with automatic weapons[3] as well as dune buggies.[4]

But as the initial fog of war lifted, it became clear that Hamas did not just get lucky with this attack. It had been training for it for years,[5] including in Iran.[6] There are also unsubstantiated reports that Hamas received training by Russian forces – or even possibly by the Wagner group. Anonymous sources were cited as saying that some Wagner members had been involved in the military training of Hamas fighters, and that a company seeking applicants for positions “in Africa and the Middle East” had offered positions to other Wagner members.[7] Other reports suggests that some of the weapons used by Hamas on October 7 came from Russia,[8] and still other reports that Russia is providing Hamas with Western weapons captured in Ukraine.[9]


Hamas delegation, headed by Hamas political bureau head Isma’il Haniyeh, in Moscow, September 11, 2022 (Source: Thecradle.co/articles/hamas-delegation-lands-in-moscow-for-official-talks#google_vignette, September 11. 2022)

Russia’s support for a designated terrorist organization, Hamas, in its attack on Israel makes sense. Russia has no qualms about maintaining good relations with other state sponsors of terrorism, as indicated most recently by its strategic summit with North Korea in September.[10] It was also one of the first countries to accept the credentials of an Afghan Taliban envoy, in March 2022.[11] Russia also maintains a close alliance with Iran, which is Hamas’s main supplier of weapons and diplomatic support. It provides Iran with intelligence and weapons in Syria as well as “digital surveillance capabilities” to suppress internal dissent at home, and in return Iran gives Russia drones, artillery shells, and ammunition for use against Ukraine and has built a drone factory in Russia.[12]

A bonus for Russia in its alliance with Iran is a close relationship with Iran’s terror proxies. In recent years, it has had contacts, meetings, and more with the Houthis in Yemen, Hizbullah in Lebanon, and Shi’ite militias in Iraq.[13] It was also reported this week that the Wagner group, which is now controlled by Russian President Vladimir Putin, is planning to send air defenses to Hizbullah, which would complicate Israel’s ability to defend its cities from Hizbullah missile attacks.[14] Following the killing of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russia lost the use of its own unofficial proxy to do its dirty work, but now Russia has access to Iran’s proxies.

Thus, Russian support for a Hamas attack on Israel, if merely tactical, is logical. As Sergey Mardan, a former Putin advisor who is now a Russian media propagandist, recently wrote on his Telegram channel: “This mess is beneficial for Russia because the globalist toad [i.e. the U.S.] will be distracted from [Russia’s war in] Ukraine and will get busy trying to put out the eternal Middle Eastern fire. Iran is our real military ally. Israel is an ally of the US. Therefore, choosing a side is easy.”[15]

Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev, MEMRI Russian Media Studies Project Special Advisor and Founder and Director of the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies, laid out a four-point explanation on reasons for Russian support of Hamas. He wrote:

“By attacking Israel – with or without Moscow’s advice or assistance – Hamas opened a new front against the West in what Putin believes is the ongoing World War III. This attack is beneficial for the Russian ‘national leader’ in several aspects.

“First, it leads to refocusing of the U.S. and European attention from Ukraine to Israel, and (as Putin hopes) to a decline in the Western assistance to Ukrainian army that may allow the Russians to stop Ukraine’s counteroffensive and recapture the strategic advantage.

“Second, Putin of course dreams of a new migration ‘earthquake’ that can send millions of refugees from the Middle East toward the borders of the European Union. It is widely known that Palestinians are not welcomed by their fellow Arab neighbors and would most probably seek asylum in Europe.

“Third, the Israeli ground operation may create a huge wave of support for ‘innocent civilians’ in Gaza adding to the ‘global South’s upheaval’ that Putin awaits, as he positions himself as the leading ‘anti-imperialist’ figure.

“Fourth, Putin wants to broaden the widespread confrontation with the West, hoping that the clash between Hizbullah and Israel may bring Iran into the expanding quarrel and therefore destabilize the entire region…”[16]

Still, much remains in question surrounding Russia reactions to Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel. Russia’s official response was not only slow in coming, but was notably muted and failed to explicitly condemn the attack. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in an October 9 daily briefing: “We believe that the situation should be brought to a peaceful resolution as soon as possible, as the continuation of such a spiral of violence is fraught with further escalation of the conflict.”[17] On October 11, President Vladimir Putin said only that both sides should “minimize or reduce to zero” civilian casualties.[18]

Russia – which on November 1 reportedly carried out its heaviest shelling of Ukrainian communities to date[19] but received little media attention for doing so – is continuing to benefit from the attack as the world’s attention has shifted from Ukraine. Even if it is not being said openly, some of the same governments that have supported Ukraine militarily, first and foremost the U.S., now could be moving Ukraine to the back burner and focusing on supporting Israel. Although NATO has promised that the war in Israel will not impact support for Ukraine,[20] for the U.S. this is less certain.[21]

A week after its attack on October 7, Hamas thanked Russian President Vladimir Putin for his statement, saying: “[We] appreciate Russian President Vladimir Putin’s position regarding the ongoing Zionist aggression against our people and his rejection of the Gaza siege, the cutting off of relief supplies, and the targeting of safe civilians there.”[22]

Regarding accusations that Hamas had received support from Iran in planning and preparing for the October 7 attack, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated strongly that charges that Iran backs Hamas are “provocative,” adding that Iran is “demonstrating a very responsible, balanced position.”[23]

As a month has passed since the Hamas attack and more information has been revealed about Iran’s involvement in it, there is no longer any question that it provided Hamas with funding, weapons, and training.[24] It is also more likely that the Hamas attack was part of the growing Iran-Russia strategic partnership, more details of which will emerge over time.

Top Russian officials have been meeting with Hamas leaders – who are designated terrorist by the U.S. and other countries – for years, and there have been many such meetings in Moscow in the past two years in particular. The Russia-Hamas relationship began in 2006, with Putin’s congratulations to Hamas for its election victory in Gaza. Details about these meetings, and reviews on Hamas’s regular communications with Russia’s Foreign Ministry and the Duma are detailed in this report.

Hamas’s reciprocal relations with Russian government and military apparatuses go deep. As the Doha-based Hamas leader abroad Khaled Mash’al said, “Russia has benefited” from the October 7 attack “because we distracted the U.S. from them and from Ukraine… The Russians told us that what happened on October 7 would be taught in military academies.” Mash’al also said that this was Russia’s opportunity to abolish the American monopoly on the world. It should be expected that as the war continues, Hamas will continue to be supported by Russia.

This report highlights Hamas officials’ statements about the Hamas-Russia relationship, including in personal meetings, prior to and following the October 7 attack, as well as Hamas officials’ statements about Russia’s reaction to the attack, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Hamas-Russia relations overall. 

Read More

Selected Articles – The News And Times

US said to delay shipment of weapons for security squads due to Ben Gvir’s conduct
Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those we are missing Those…
 

As Hamas Visits Its ‘Closest Friend’ Moscow, Questions Surround Russia’s Knowledge Of, Involvement In October 7 Hamas Attack: A Review Of Russia-Hamas Ties and Strategic Relationship
Introduction Hamas’s surprise October 7, 2023 terror attack, in which over 1,400 were brutally murdered and another 241 (at last count) taken hostage, will go down in infamy. As Hamas leader abroad Khaled Mashal boasted on October 26 on Egypt’s Sada Elbalad TV, the Russians told him that this attack would be taught in military academies.[1] In the…
 

Russia Is the Loser in the Israel-Hamas War
In the fall of 2012, I took part in an open discussion at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on Russia’s role in the Middle East. In her presentation, an experienced American diplomat focused on how Russia was a spent force that would never be able to recapture the Soviet Union’s prominence in the region. With few dissenting voices, the discussion was remarkable…
 

Escalating violence in Gaza increasing chatter of possible terror attack in New York, intelligence report says
By Marcia Kramer Updated on: November 20, 2023 / 5:15 PM EST / CBS New York NEW YORK — CBS News learned Monday of increased threats of a possible terror attack in New York City as a direct result of the escalating violence in the Middle East. Gov. Kathy Hochul is already taking action to beef up security and increase staffing of the Joint…
 
What Will Happen In Gaza After Israel Stops Its War On Hamas? – NDTV
What Will Happen In Gaza After Israel Stops Its War On Hamas?  NDTV
 
Is Russia recruiting Muslim migrants to fight its war in Ukraine? – Al Jazeera English
Is Russia recruiting Muslim migrants to fight its war in Ukraine?  Al Jazeera English
 
Vladimir Putin’s life expectancy ‘much shorter’ amid heart attack rumours, top doc says – The Mirror
Vladimir Putin’s life expectancy ‘much shorter’ amid heart attack rumours, top doc says  The Mirror
 
Pressure on Netanyahu to quit, but few paths to his ouster – Jewish Insider
Pressure on Netanyahu to quit, but few paths to his ouster  Jewish Insider
 
‘What good news’: Russia on ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas – Hindustan Times
‘What good news’: Russia on ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas  Hindustan Times
 
Mercenarii Wagner Group îşi refac simţită prezenţa şi profită de … – DefenseRomania
Mercenarii Wagner Group îşi refac simţită prezenţa şi profită de …  DefenseRomania
 
‘No one trusts Netanyahu’: Israel’s war cabinet divided amid Gaza … – Al Jazeera English
‘No one trusts Netanyahu’: Israel’s war cabinet divided amid Gaza …  Al Jazeera English
 
EU to boost Gaza aid amid Israel-Hamas truce – Al Jazeera English
EU to boost Gaza aid amid Israel-Hamas truce  Al Jazeera English
 
No Exit From Gaza – Foreign Affairs Magazine
No Exit From Gaza  Foreign Affairs Magazine
 
BRICS could help reach political settlement in Gaza conflict: Putin – Al Arabiya English
BRICS could help reach political settlement in Gaza conflict: Putin  Al Arabiya English
 
Russia welcomes ceasefire between Israel and Hamas – DAWN.com
Russia welcomes ceasefire between Israel and Hamas  DAWN.com
 
Israel set to approve Gaza hostage deal slated to see release of 50 Israelis – The Times of Israel
Israel set to approve Gaza hostage deal slated to see release of 50 Israelis  The Times of Israel
 
US fighter jets strike Iran-backed targets in Iraq after repeated attacks on US bases – The Times of Israel
US fighter jets strike Iran-backed targets in Iraq after repeated attacks on US bases  The Times of Israel
 
White House warns: Wagner Group plans to provide air defense … – Arutz Sheva
White House warns: Wagner Group plans to provide air defense …  Arutz Sheva
 
Ukraine-Russia war live: Putin drafting Wagner Group mercenaries into national guard, UK says – Yahoo News UK
Ukraine-Russia war live: Putin drafting Wagner Group mercenaries into national guard, UK says  Yahoo News UK
 
The Wagner Group is back, Russian regional media says — and led by Prigozhin’s son – Yahoo News UK
The Wagner Group is back, Russian regional media says — and led by Prigozhin’s son  Yahoo News UK
 

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@mikenov: Russia, Hamas, Wagner Group in Israel and Gaza, and the October 7, 2023