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@mikenov: wagner group and Ramzan Kadyrov



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Chechen leader Kadyrov says ex-Wagner fighters are training with his forces


Russian President Putin and Chechen leader Kadyrov meet in Moscow

File photo: Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov attends a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Russia, September 28, 2023. Sputnik/Mikhail Metzel/Pool via REUTERS/File photo Acquire Licensing Rights

Nov 6 (Reuters) – A large group of Russia’s former Wagner mercenaries has started training with special forces from the southern Russian region of Chechnya, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov said on Monday.

Wagner played a prominent role in some of the fiercest fighting of Russia’s war in Ukraine, but its future was thrown into question when its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin was killed in a plane crash in August, two months after leading a brief mutiny against the Russian defence establishment.

Kadyrov said in a message on Telegram that a big group of ex-Wagner fighters was undergoing intensive training with his own Akhmat special forces.

“I am glad that today the ranks of the famous (Akhmat) unit have been joined by fighters who have excellent combat experience and have proven themselves as brave and efficient warriors,” he said.

“I am confident that in the upcoming battles they will fully live up to their reputation.”

He published a video, accompanied by stirring music, showing soldiers in combat training, including some wearing Wagner insignia on their uniforms and masks over their faces. Kadyrov said the drills included shooting, field medicine and training for snipers, machine gunners, sappers and artillerymen.

It was not clear how many Wagner men were taking part or whether any of them would stay on with the Chechen forces after the training was over.

After Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin rejected as an “absolute lie” suggestions that he had been killed on President Vladimir Putin’s orders to punish him for the June mutiny. Russia has yet to publish the results of an investigation into the fatal plane crash.

Putin subsequently moved to bring Wagner’s fighters under the control of the state, ordering them to sign an oath of allegiance, and the Kremlin has repeatedly said the group does not exist as a legal entity.

Reporting by Mark Trevelyan
Editing by Gareth Jones

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.


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Intelligence failure or not, the Israeli military was unprepared to respond to Hamas’ attack


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Over the course of my military career in special operations, I conducted hundreds of tactical, operational and strategic missions based on intelligence. Never once did I expect intelligence to be perfect.

In fact, it rarely was. I based my plan on the best intelligence available, but I also thought of every possible scenario that I could in order to be ready for anything the enemy might throw at me. It seems the Israelis didn’t do that.

If the definition of an intelligence failure is “when something bad happens to you and you didn’t know about it,” as former U.S. Sen. Warren Rudman once described it, then the Hamas surprise attack on Israel was clearly an intelligence failure.

At present, no one knows why the Israelis were unable to detect the Hamas attack, and it may be many months before the Israelis can answer the question.

Historically, Israel has been perhaps the best government in the world at penetrating terrorist organizations, which are arguably the most difficult to infiltrate with informants.

Israel built a defense plan that relies on preventing rocket attacks, border crossings and early warnings.

But intelligence can only do so much. The other key piece of defense is understanding how your enemy thinks and operates. And there the Israelis also appeared to struggle.

Intelligence can only do so much. The other key piece of defense is understanding how your enemy thinks and operates. And there the Israelis also appeared to struggle.

Known as the Iron Wall, the 40-mile-long security barrier that separates Gaza from Israel was completed in 2021 at a cost of US$1.1 billion. It includes a sensor-equipped, 20-foot-tall fence, hundreds of cameras and automated machine gun fire when sensors are tripped.

But the wall was not effective against the surprise Hamas attack. Hamas was able to breach the barrier in multiple locations around Gaza and continue its attacks without much initial resistance.

Likewise, Israel built its Iron Dome, an air defense system, to protect its citizens from rocket attacks emanating from Gaza. Completed in 2011, the dome cost the U.S. and Israeli governments $1.5 billion to develop and maintain. Before the surprise Hamas attack, the defense system had a success rate of between 90%-97% of striking down enemy rockets.

The Iron Dome worked well when militants launched relatively few rockets, but it was less effective against the Hamas attack. When Hamas launched as many as 3,000 rockets into Israel in just 20 minutes, the system was overwhelmed and unable to respond. The quantity “was simply too much for Iron Dome to manage,” according to an analysis by the Modern War Institute at West Point.

In my view, the Hamas attack was not particularly sophisticated, nor particularly innovative. At its core, the attack was a textbook military operation involving ground, sea and air attacks launched by one group against another.

It’s my belief that this type of basic attack is something that the Israelis could have and should have anticipated — even if not on the scale it was executed. Given that the basic goal of Hamas is “destroy the State of Israel,” Israel could have developed a defense plan that was not reliant on intelligence that is inherently unreliable.

Ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu stressed the importance of “knowing the enemy.”

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles,” he wrote in “The Art of War.”

The problem for the Israelis, and many modern militaries, is that they have become too reliant on intelligence instead of knowing the goals of their enemy and developing a deeper understanding of how they think and operate.

That understanding may not prevent the next surprise attack, but it can help prepare the military defense.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Liam Collins is the founding director of the Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy West Point. High school student Ian Shaw contributed to the research and writing of this article. Through its opinion section, Kansas Reflector works to amplify the voices of people who are affected by public policies or excluded from public debate. Find information, including how to submit your own commentary, here.


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@mikenov: Hamas’s attack was an Israeli intelligence failure on multiple fronts It was also a textbook military operation



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@mikenov: Hamas’s attack was an Israeli intelligence failure on multiple fronts https://t.co/I0mCk4pKch via https://t.co/kJbJFYDK6F 📷 THE VICIOUS success of Hamas’s attack on Israel, without their plans being unveiled, is matched by the astounding failure of Israeli intelligence at every…



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