From 29 February to 2 March, there will be an intra-Palestinian meeting in Moscow under the Russian government’s auspices. Officials representing Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah, and approximately ten other Palestinian factions received invitations and will participate.

“Moscow’s goal is to help the various Palestinian forces agree to unite their ranks politically,” said Mikhail Bogdanov, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s envoy for the Middle East and Africa.

While Israel, the US, and other Western governments recognise a host of these Palestinian organisations as terrorist entities, Moscow does not.

By hosting these factions, Russia is promoting a narrative about Moscow being a defender of the Palestinian cause, which sends a strong message to the wider Arab-Islamic world and the Global South at large.

This of course comes at a time in which Washington’s ironclad support for Israeli war crimes in Gaza has severely eroded US soft power influence outside the West.

“Moscow seeks to demonstrate to the rest of the world that Russia can host an inter-Palestinian dialogue without necessarily taking any faction’s side”

Moscow’s dealings with Hamas

Russia has a record of engaging Hamas. Over the years, Hamas representatives have paid visits to Moscow, which has constituted a source of tension in Russia’s relationship with Israel.

Nonetheless, Putin’s government has managed to avoid allowing its engagement with Hamas to create any major crisis in Moscow-Tel Aviv relations. From the Kremlin’s perspective, Hamas is an actor that Russia must deal with as Moscow strives to assert greater influence in the Middle East and, specifically, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In late October 2023, Russia invited Hamas representatives to Moscow. At the time, the Kremlin was focused on securing the release of dual Israeli-Russian citizens held hostage by Hamas in Gaza. Such efforts led to positive results.

After the Hamas members arrived in Moscow, they received a list of hostages with Russian citizenship whom the Russian government wanted the Palestinian group to free at once.

“We are very attentive to this list and will process it carefully because we look at Russia as our closest friend,” explained Mousa Abu Marzouk, a senior member of Hamas, while speaking to RIA Novosti news agency during Hamas’s visit to Moscow. “As soon as we find them, we’ll release them.”

By early November, Hamas made good on those words and released three Israeli-Russian hostages. One was Roni Krivoi, the first adult male hostage with an Israeli passport to be released by Hamas since 7 October.

“We are grateful to the leadership of the Hamas movement for their positive response to our urgent appeals,” said Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova after their release. “We will continue to strive for the speedy release of the remaining Russians held in the Gaza Strip.”

It can be taken for granted that securing the release of remaining hostages will be a priority for Moscow as it engages further with Hamas. Russia’s ability to leverage its relationship with Hamas serves Moscow’s interests vis-à-vis Tel Aviv.

Putin playing this card can help dissuade Israel from being tempted to join the West in imposing sanctions on Russia or arming Ukraine two years into Moscow’s war against its smaller neighbour.

Russian diplomacy amid the Gaza war

The upcoming inter-Palestinian meeting in Moscow needs to be understood within the wider context of Russia’s past few months of diplomacy vis-à-vis the Israeli war on Gaza. As Dr Samuel Ramani, an associate fellow at the London-based Royal United Services Institute, explained in an interview with The New Arab, Moscow has engaged in two layers of diplomacy since this war began. Both remain in motion.

First, the Kremlin is engaging the major state actors with stakes in Gaza, which include Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Such shuttle diplomacy has been part of a grander Russian strategy of asserting Moscow’s clout in the Middle East and promoting multipolarity. Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joining together as UN Security Council members in calling for a ceasefire is one example.

Second, because of tensions in Israeli-Russian relations, the Kremlin has focused on inter-Palestinian dialogue over dialogue between the Palestinians and Israel. Officials in Moscow are “looking toward the end of the war and they’re trying to use the fact that they can engage with the [Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)], Hamas, and even Islamic Jihad,” according to Dr Ramani.

“Islamic Jihad has a different tune than Hamas, even on the hostages. They’re much more radical. They’re much more recalcitrant about any kind of diplomacy. If [the Russians] can bring them to Moscow and get them talking with the other factions that would be something noteworthy and interesting to think about too,” he added.

“Because of tensions in Israeli-Russian relations, the Kremlin has focused on inter-Palestinian dialogue over dialogue between the Palestinians and Israel”

A dialogue that helps Russia with optics

Moscow seeks to demonstrate to the rest of the world that Russia can host an inter-Palestinian dialogue without necessarily taking any faction’s side. This is important to Moscow’s balancing act in the Arab world, where different states have various views on Hamas.

For example, Qatar, on one end of the spectrum, accepts the reality of Hamas as a player in the Palestinian political space. But the UAE, on the other end, opposes the group largely due to ideological reasons – specifically Hamas’s Muslim Brotherhood origins.

Despite some commentators’ baseless claims of a Russia-Hamas “alliance”, Putin’s government chooses to not take sides in inter-Palestinian power struggles. Indeed, being overtly pro-Hamas would upset Abu Dhabi, which Russia is generally keen to avoid doing given that the UAE is, by far, Moscow’s best friend in the GCC.

Rather than taking sides in Palestinian politics, Moscow has decided to “act as a convening power that can bring together the PLO, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad for dialogue,” Dr Ramani told TNA.

Russia playing this diplomatic role two years after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine serves to counter Western efforts to isolate Moscow internationally. “Regardless of the outcome of the meeting, pro-Kremlin propaganda will use it to show that Russia is not isolated in the global arena,” explained Nikola Mikovic, a Belgrade-based political analyst, in a TNA interview.

While bringing various Palestinian factions together for this meeting bodes well for Russia in terms of optics, some analysts question whether this dialogue in Moscow has a shot at producing concrete results.

“Of course, it’s impossible to see Islamic Jihad making concessions right now…Very little substantive will come out of this,” said Dr Ramani, who also questions the likelihood of the PLO being willing to concede much to Hamas and other Palestinian groups on delicate issues.

“While bringing various Palestinian factions together for this meeting bodes well for Russia in terms of optics, some analysts question whether this dialogue has a shot at producing concrete results”

Other analysts have a similar assessment. “Russia’s influence in Palestine is very limited, and I don’t think Moscow is in a position to force Palestinian factions to unite, especially given that each group is supported by different regional actors,” Mikovic told TNA. “I will be very surprised if Moscow manages to persuade Hamas to form a partnership with the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority,” added the Serbian expert on Russian foreign policy.

“Hamas and other Palestinian groups are very naïve if they really think that Russia – a country that, two years after the invasion of Ukraine, has not achieved any of its goals in the Eastern European nation – can help them achieve their goals in the Middle East. Besides, if Russia never protects its ally Syria from Israeli airstrikes, it is rather questionable if the Kremlin really aims to help Palestinians in their struggle for independence,” explained Mikovic.

Looking ahead, there are several key questions to raise about what this inter-Palestinian meeting in Moscow will mean for the future of Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East. It is unclear how Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian factions scattered across Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and other Middle Eastern countries will look at Russia after the dust eventually settles in Gaza.

Might these Palestinian groups ask Moscow to become more involved in diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving tensions between Palestinian groups, or perhaps as a bridge between the Palestinians and Israel?

Time will tell. But even if so, Egypt and Qatar – and not Russia – will probably remain the main mediators vis-à-vis Israel-Palestine. Dr Ramani doubts that this upcoming inter-Palestinian meeting in Moscow will lead to any “long-term seismic change in the geopolitical landscape” although he predicts a “temporary optical win for the Russians”.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics.

Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero

This week, delegates from various Palestinian factions will travel to Moscow for talks on the Israel-Hamas war and other Middle Eastern topics at an “inter-Palestinian dialogue.”

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov told Russian state news agency TASS that between 12 and 14 organizations will attend the conference, which begins on February 29 and will run for two or three days. 

This includes representatives of the political arm of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, the political organization running the occupied West Bank and the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO, the broader umbrella organization for all Palestinian groups.

The various groups take very different positions on topics like the recognition of Israel as a state. The Fatah-led PLO recognized Israel in 1993, partially in exchange for a possible Palestinian state. Hamas has rejected that stance for years, even though recently its rhetoric has softened. It is not part of the PLO.

Fatah manages the West Bank, which has also seen clashes between the Israeli military and PalestiniansImage: Majdi Mohammed/AP Photo/picture alliance

There has also been violence between the groups. After Hamas won elections in Gaza in 2006, it was unable to come to a power-sharing deal with the more moderate Fatah and fighting broke out. Fatah eventually left the Gaza Strip, leaving Hamas in charge there, and now manages the West Bank. Its governing authority there is also known as the Palestinian Authority, or PA.

‘Dialogue for dialogue’s sake’

This isn’t the first time a more unified Palestinian front has been discussed. As Ruslan Suleymanov, an independent Russian Middle East expert based in Baku, told DW, there has been mediation between the different groups before. “But they have never been effective,” he said.

In this case, “Russia does not have any road map for the Palestinian file, especially for the Gaza Strip as it would be necessary to have mediation functions and maintain good contacts with both Israel and the paramilitary wing of Hamas in Gaza,” said Suleymanov.

Instead, he thinks Moscow’s main goals are to show that it has some influence on Palestinian factions and to use the timing ahead of Russia’s presidential election to show off its geopolitical clout. Russians will go to the polls in mid-March, but there is no doubt that the incumbent, President Vladimir Putin, will win.

“It’s really just dialogue for dialogue’s sake,” Suleymanov added. 

PA head and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is increasingly unpopular and is unlikely to win elections, if they were heldImage: Christophe Ena/AP/dpa/picture alliance

This view was echoed by Hugh Lovatt, senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

“This Russian summit is a way to show that Russia has the diplomatic capacity to play a hands-on role in supporting Palestinian national unity,” he told DW. However, previous reconciliation talks that were hosted in Moscow, Algiers and Cairo have “also not succeeded in brokering a lasting reconciliation deal between the rivals,” he said.

Palestinian fragmentation

“The divergences between the Palestinian groups include far-reaching political differences relating to the peace process and national liberation strategy as well as technical questions in terms of how to bring the Palestinian Authority’s institutions back to Gaza,” said Lovatt.

Hamas, which is classified as a terrorist organization by Germany, the European Union, the United States and other governments, has run Gaza since 2007. Any future, postwar scenario that returns the Palestinian Authority to Gaza and integrates Hamas politically in the occupied West Bank would have to be based on some form of understanding between Hamas and the PA, Lovatt told DW.

For Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh, who handed in his resignation on February 26, this is a possibility. Earlier in February, he told reporters at the Munich Security Conference that Hamas was an integral part of the Palestinian political arena. “They need to come to our political agenda. Our ground is very clear. Two states on the borders of 1967, through peaceful means. The Palestinians need to be under one umbrella,” he said.

There are certainly problems with that idea. A number of countries have said Hamas should not be able to play a role in governance after the conflict ends. Israel, in particular, is opposed to this option. It’s also hard to know how Hamas’ harder attitude toward recognizing Israel would fit in with the PLO, which has already recognized Israel. 

And yet, for Russia, even if the meeting doesn’t go well, the continuing Palestinian divergence would not necessarily be a negative result. The meeting would still help consolidate Russia’s future role in the Middle East.

Russia as Middle East mediator

For many years, Russia managed to keep close ties with Israel despite also maintaining good relations with one of Israel’s regional opponents, Iran. Following Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022, relations soured when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu didn’t show support for Russia’s invasion and thousands of Russians and Ukrainians fled to Israel.

Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) and Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu were close for many yearsImage: Maxim Shemetov/REUTERS

However, Baku-based analyst Suleymanov believes Russia can’t really “afford to lose Israel either.” The Russian-speaking community has been the largest minority in Israel since close to a million people of Jewish origin migrated to Israel following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

Ties between Russia and Iran have also grown closer, though. Iran is known to support Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi paramilitary groups and the Houthi rebels in Yemen in one way or another. All of these consider the US and Israel as their enemies.

Russia has long maintained ties with Palestinian militants, and its contacts with Hamas have already led to some success. In October, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Bogdanov, who is also Putin’s special envoy for the Middle East, handed a list of kidnapped Israelis of Russian origin or dual nationality to the political representatives of Hamas in Qatar and asked for their release.

Putin has improved ties with Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi since Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022Image: Sergei Bobylyov/AFP/Getty Images

Roni Krivoi, a Russian-Israeli sound technician, was released by Hamas on November 26 in addition to 13 Israelis who were freed as part of a temporary cease-fire brokered by Qatar and the United States. As The Washington Post noted at the time, “he became the first adult male with an Israeli passport set free, even as most of the exchanges involved women and children.” 

This article was updated on February 26 to reflect the resignation of Mohammad Shtayyeh as Palestinian prime minister.

DW’s Studio Riga contributed to this article.

Edited by: Cathrin Schaer