Following a meeting with his French and Polish counterparts, Germany’s Chancellor Scholz said Europe will use profits from seized Russian assets to purchase weapons for Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/7RPYdAZvPd
— DW News (@dwnews) March 15, 2024
Day: March 16, 2024
“HAGUE”
How Russians are using spoiled ballots to fight back against Putin’s facade of democracy 🧵 pic.twitter.com/ATwZQjAEHV
— Mikhail Khodorkovsky (@khodorkovsky_en) March 16, 2024
Reading this, I think of Russia’s influence campaign, from the shadows of the Cold War to the digital battlegrounds of today, using #propaganda, disinformation, cyber warfare, and covert maneuvers to sow discord and erode trust in #Democracy. #USA https://t.co/PZKhXv8GQk pic.twitter.com/wsSaAMqdIQ
— Robert Morton (@Robert4787) March 16, 2024
A special analysis conducted by the business intelligence company “Buzzilla” for Maariv shows that in the last three weeks, the general discourse on Arabic language social media in Gaza has been mainly positive towards the Hamas terrorist organization in general and towards its leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, in particular.
The data analysis showed that the general discourse towards Sinwar is positive—a surprising figure since discourse on social media tends to be critical.
The company’s experts point out that it is possible to detect an increase in the positive discourse towards Sinwar personally when threats against him from the Israeli side come up in the media.
For example, after the IDF spokesman stated that “the fighters will get to Sinwar alive or dead,” many reactions were seen on Gazan social media praising him as the one who surprised Israel, and despite all the intelligence in Israel’s possession, he is still in hiding.
No conversation calling for the release of the abductees was found during the inspection.
Yahya Sinwar, leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, attends a rally marking the anniversary of Land Day, in Gaza City on March 30, 2022 (credit: ATTIA MUHAMMED/FLASH90)
Analysis of support for Sinwar
In the first period, between February 25 and March 2, nearly 20,000 interactions dealing with Sinwar were recorded, with the great majority of them being positive.
The posters mainly responded to comments about the war with an emphasis on the possibility of a hostage deal, in which they praised and glorified his personality. For example, a comment was found in which one of the posters wished “that her son would be a leader like Sinwar.”
Alongside the positive discourse, many comments were found that blamed Israel for the situation in Gaza, wished for the “destruction of the Zionist enemy,” and prayed for the Palestinian people.
In the second period, from March 3 to March 9, there was a jump in the amount of discussion about Sinwar on Gazan social media.
Almost 44,000 interactions were found, with the assessment that the cause of the increase is the culture of reports about the possibility of a hostage release deal and a ceasefire before Ramadan.
Precisely during this period, there was a moderate increase in the number of negative reactions towards Sinwar and Hamas, possibly in anticipation of a pause in the fighting and an understanding of the size of the destruction in the Gaza Strip.
Negative reactions can be seen mainly in articles that review the damage in Gaza – starting with the displaced, through the destruction of the infrastructure, and ending with the dead.
In response to these publications, many posters can be seen asking, “Where is Sinwar?”.
The company’s experts also identified a broad discourse that directly blames the Gazan leader (“You destroyed us,” “It wasn’t worth it,” and even curses, “May God curse you, Sinwar”).
On the other hand, broad support was still identified among the posters and called to “destroy the Zionist enemy.”
In the third period, March 10 to March 13, there were again many positive reactions towards the leadership of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and many negative reactions towards Israel.
With Ramadan starting without achieving a pause in fighting, many comments were found that praised Sinwar as someone who “stands firm in the face of Israeli threats.”
The increase in the positive discourse towards Hamas is also attributed to the many reports according to which Israel apparently succeeded in eliminating the “Hamas Chief of Staff” Marwan Issa.
Yahya Sinwar’s self-inflicted injury. (Arab social media)
The clandestine planning and execution of the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by the military leadership of Hamas in the Gaza Strip left many bewildered, including supposed allies such as Iran and Hizbullah.
The decision to withhold the precise timing of the attack from these factions aimed to catch Israel off guard, a strategy that proved more successful than anticipated.
However, this tactical maneuver ultimately backfired, leading to the erosion of Hamas’ control in the Gaza Strip due to a miscalculation of Israel’s response.
As time progresses, insights into the decision-making process behind the assault orchestrated by Yahya Sinwar and Muhammad Deif are beginning to surface.
According to officials within Hamas, the military leadership acted independently, neglecting collaboration with traditional allies such as Iran and Hizbullah, among others.
While Iran was generally aware of Hamas’ intention to strike Israel, the specific timing remained concealed from both Iran and Hizbullah. This deliberate secrecy aimed to ensure Yahya Sinwar received full credit for the operation.
In a captured transcript from a meeting in January 2023, Sinwar allegedly affirmed Iran’s commitment to support Hamas in its “war of liberation.”
Sinwar and Deif meticulously compartmentalized information to optimize the element of surprise, even withholding details from the political leadership of Hamas until shortly before the attack.
Only an hour before the assault, Sinwar briefed Saleh Al-Arouri, Hamas’ deputy chairman and head of the military wing in Judea and Samaria.
The decision to bypass the consensus of Hamas’ advisory Shura Council underscores the military leadership’s determination to maintain secrecy and maximize the element of surprise.
To mitigate tensions between the military and political wings, Hamas leaders abroad retroactively endorsed the military’s authority to execute such operations independently. However, this unilateral action strained relations with Iran and Hizbullah, both of which were caught off guard by the attack.
Consequently, Hamas finds itself isolated, devoid of the anticipated military support that could have potentially sustained its position in the conflict.
Hizbullah has opted for a restrained approach to its conflict with Israel in southern Lebanon, refraining from escalating to all-out war.
Surprisingly, Hamas itself was taken aback by the magnitude of its success in the assault on Israeli settlements.
Sinwar and Deif had underestimated Israel’s response, anticipating a limited engagement akin to previous skirmishes rather than the full-scale conflict that ensued. This misjudgment mirrors Hassan Nasrallah’s error in triggering the Second Lebanon War in 2006, highlighting a recurring pattern of flawed assessments of Israel’s reactions.
Musa Abu Marzouk, a senior Hamas official, admitted to the unexpected severity of Israel’s retaliation, acknowledging a lack of anticipation for the unwavering support from Western powers.
The fate of the numerous Israeli captives held by Hamas hangs in the balance, raising doubts about the organization’s survival and its ability to claim victory.
Presently, Hamas’ military leadership has lost control over the Gaza Strip, with significant casualties and the IDF’s occupation of strategic territories.
Fleeing into tunnels, they face imminent capture or elimination by IDF forces.
The populace in Gaza views the unilateral decision of Hamas’ military leadership as a catastrophic misstep, predicting further hardship rather than relief from the blockade or the establishment of vital infrastructure.
In the aftermath of the conflict, Hamas will undoubtedly reassess its internal dynamics, particularly the relationship between its military and political wings.
However, the repercussions extend beyond Hamas, with the broader Muslim Brotherhood movement losing a key stronghold in the Arab world.
The once-powerful Islamic Emirate in Gaza, established in 2007, has now crumbled, leaving Hamas to contend with the aftermath of its ill-fated decision-making.