The Ocean Avenue News - oceanavenuenews.comIt’s not utopian thinking to imagine that, for the first time in world history, everyone could have a decent standard of living
As we celebrate Labor Day, 2023 let’s take a quick look at the economy over the last few years.
Never before in American history have so few owned so much and has there been so much income and wealth inequality.
The post Why this Labor Day is so consequential | Bernie Sanders first appeared on The News And Times – thenewsandtimes.com.
The UN and Turkey-brokered deal, which aimed to ensure safe navigation for civilian ships through the Black Sea, collapsed after Russia pulled out in July.
The post Russia Pledges Free Grain to Africa, Turkey Opposes Alternatives to Ukraine Deal: Putin-Erdogan Meeting Highlights first appeared on The News And Times – thenewsandtimes.com.
Pope Francis said he was referring to Russia’s rich cultural tradition when he spoke of a “great Russia” in a speech last month, comments that sparked outrage in Ukraine.
The post Pope Says ‘Great Russia’ Comments Referred to Culture first appeared on The News And Times – thenewsandtimes.com.
Security Joes researchers have observed an unknown threat actor using a publicly available exploit chain for vulnerabilities in the MinIO Object Storage system to achieve arbitrary code execution on vulnerable servers.
Object Storage is a data storage architecture for storing unstructured data into units called “objects” and storing them in a structurally flat data environment. The leading providers of such services are AWS, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Azure.
Upon investigating, Security Joes researchers discovered that the exploit chain was not observed in the wild before, or at least documented.
“The chain of vulnerabilities observed by our team during an attack we’ve investigated presents a worrisome situation where attackers can potentially gain the ability to remotely execute code and take full control over systems running vulnerable versions of the high-performance and distributed object storage system called MinIO.” reads the report published by Security Joes. “This product is part of a larger set of “non-yet-existing” set of attack vectors referred to as Non-native Object Storage Services.”
The exploit, dubbed Evil_MinIO, uses CVE-2023-28434 (CVSS score: 8.8) and CVE-2023-28432 (CVSS score: 7.5) vulnerabilities.
In April, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added MinIO vulnerability CVE-2023-28432 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
The researchers discovered that the evil_minio exploit code is available on a GitHub repository.
The flaws can be exploited by remote attackers to expose sensitive information stored in the compromised installation and facilitate Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the host where the MinIO application is operational.
An attacker can trigger the issue sending a crafted request to the endpoint “/minio/bootstrap/v1/verify” and retrieving the admin credentials of a vulnerable instance.
“The exploitation process begins with a crafted request targeting the endpoint “/minio/bootstrap/v1/verify”, which allows the attacker to obtain the values of the environment variables used by the application.” continues the report. “This becomes particularly significant because MinIO relies on environment variables to configure the administrator credentials, escalating the severity of the vulnerability. In other words, with a single request, an attacker can retrieve the admin credentials of a vulnerable instance.”
A mc admin update command updates all MinIO servers in the deployment, it also supports the use of a private mirror server for environments where the deployment does not have public internet access.
An attacker can arrange a deceptive update by pushing an ‘evil’ update instead of the authentic MinIO binary.
Below is the step-by-step procedure to remotely execute arbitrary code in a vulnerable MinIO instance:
The experts pointed out that different from web shell deployment, in the attack MinIO scenario, attackers leave no traces of conventional suspicious scripts on the disk
“The intricate nature of this threat renders traditional signature-based detectors inadequate in capturing its presence, as demonstrated in Figure 7. Remarkably, even a month after its initial report, the file continues to exhibit zero detections through traditional signature-based detection mechanisms.” continues the report.
According to the experts, the threat actor behind the attack has a unique profile, it has a significant degree of experience and expertise in working with bash scripts and the Python. The attackers also show the ability to use the backdoor access to drop supplementary payloads for post-exploitation activities.
The attackers are able to target both Linux and Windows systems using specific Downloader Script.s
At the time of the publication of the report, the researchers found over 50,000 MinIO installs exposed online using Shodan.
The report also includes Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for this campaign.
Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon
(SecurityAffairs – hacking, backdoor)
The post Publicly available Evil_MinIO exploit used in attacks on MinIO Storage Systems appeared first on Security Affairs.
The post Publicly available Evil_MinIO exploit used in attacks on MinIO Storage Systems first appeared on The News And Times – thenewsandtimes.com.
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The long and winding road lyrics | YouTube
For nearly 25 years, traffic between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh traveled along a road known as the Lachin Corridor. It was constructed in 1998, shortly after Armenians won the territory in a war with Azerbaijan, and funded by Armenian diaspora members with money raised at a telethon. Since then, it has represented a critical lifeline for the Armenian residents of Karabakh.
BREAKING: Ukraine’s President Zelensky announced 41-year-old Crimean Tatar Rustem Omerov, current head of State Property Fund, will replace Reznikov as Minister of Defense. This is a very welcome development. 
pic.twitter.com/ZwEqkFv1sO— Igor Sushko (@igorsushko) September 3, 2023 The News And Times Information Network – Blogs By Michael Novakhov…The post The long and winding roads of the South Caucasus first appeared on The News And Times – thenewsandtimes.com.
Two significant developments have recently profoundly impacted security formation in the South Caucasus: Azerbaijan’s Karabakh Victory, and ramifications of the Russia-Ukraine war on the region.
After the Karabakh Victory and before the Russia-Ukraine War, the most important step in the field of security was the Shusha declaration signed between Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The parliaments of both countries approved this declaration, and thus it became an international agreement. The agreement envisages military cooperation between the two countries and cooperation in economy, transportation and trade. For example, a preferential trade agreement was signed between Azerbaijan and Türkiye within this framework.
Before the Russia-Ukraine war, Azerbaijan signed a declaration of alliance with Russia. However, this declaration was not brought onto the agenda of the respective parliaments and did not prevent Azerbaijan from remaining neutral in the conflict. Azerbaijan has supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in this war and even sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
The Russia-Ukraine war has increased the strategic value of Azerbaijan in terms of global energy and transportation opportunities. First, through the Tripartite Declaration signed after the Karabakh War, the possibility of the Zangezur Corridor emerged. It is a project that was supported by both Russia and Western states. Moreover, the Middle Corridor project, which is an initiative of the Organization of Turkish States and passes through Azerbaijan, has increased Azerbaijan’s importance in terms of global transportation and food security. There has been increasing traffic in negotiations between the region’s states to realize this corridor. Bilateral and multiple meetings were held to accelerate the transition towards the Middle Corridor to reduce customs tariffs.
The second most important development in this regard has been in the field of energy supply. European countries signed a new energy memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Azerbaijan on July 18, 2022, within the framework of the policy of diversifying their energy resources. With this MoU, it was decided to increase the capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor, which carries Azerbaijani gas from the Azerbaijan Shah Deniz-2 project to the European market, by up to 32 billion cubic meters by 2027.
Azerbaijan has also signed new agreements to export Kazakh oil to the energy market via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa pipelines through Azerbaijan. This will increase Kazakhstan’s energy export security and Azerbaijan’s future as an energy transit country.
In contrast, demand for renewable energy sources has increased in the energy sector. Various agreements have been signed between Azerbaijan and European countries on this issue. Electricity produced from renewable energy sources in Azerbaijan will be exported to Europe via Georgia and Türkiye. Azerbaijan has declared that it is ready to cooperate with Kazakhstan.
The Azerbaijan-Armenia normalization process, closely related to the region’s security, has not yet achieved any serious success and a threat to regional security remains. Instead of signing a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, Armenia is delaying the process by putting forward various preconditions while Armenian officials complain about Azerbaijan in international meetings.
As widely reported, Azerbaijan has presented a five-item package of proposals that include mutual recognition of the territorial integrity of the parties. Ultimately, the Prime Minister of Armenia recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including Karabakh. However, the demand for an international mechanism for the rights and security of Armenians residing within the territorial domain of Azerbaijan is still being put forward, which negatively affects the negotiations.
Meanwhile, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan ignored the demand for the right of return of more than 200,000 Azerbaijanis expelled from Armenia between 1987-1990. The Azerbaijanis who were expelled from Armenia have organized and have started working to return to their lands in Armenia. At the present stage, some representatives of international organizations are seriously interested in this issue. During the period of occupation, Armenia destroyed the houses of Azerbaijanis and looted their cultural assets. The Armenian government will therefore have to compensate monetarily.
Armenia still refrains from fulfilling the conditions of the tripartite declaration that ended the war on Nov. 10, 2020. There are still some 10,000 Armenian military personnel on the territory of Azerbaijan. Additionally, contrary to the declaration, regional communication and transportation lines remain unopened.
Georgia has a goal of membership in NATO and the EU. However, in the post-Russia-Ukraine war period, Tbilisi has been unable to attract sufficient attention from the West. After the second Karabakh War, as before, Georgia supports regional transport and energy projects and cooperation mechanisms. After the war, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev proposed the construction of the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Armenia tripartite platform. While Georgia supported this platform, Armenia did not.
Türkiye became a stabilizing actor in the region with the victory of its ally Azerbaijan in the second Karabakh War and through the Shusha Declaration. Through agreements signed between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the Azerbaijani army is switching to the Turkish military model. For this reason, commando units are being established in the liberated Azerbaijani territories. Moreover, cooperation between the two countries in the field of the defense industry is increasing exponentially.
Türkiye and Azerbaijan also work in the spirit of allies on energy, transport, and trade projects and want to include other regional actors in this cooperation. In 2020, the heads of state of Azerbaijan and Türkiye proposed a platform consisting of all six regional states, including Russia, Türkiye, and Iran, for regional cooperation.
Another critical issue concerning the region’s security is the Türkiye-Armenia normalization process. After victory in the Second Karabakh War, opportunities emerged for normalizing relations between these two countries, and both appointed special representatives for this purpose. However, the fact that Armenia has not signed a peace agreement with Azerbaijan negatively affects this process.
After Azerbaijan’s victory in Karabakh, Iran had difficulty adapting its own policies to the geopolitical reality in the region. Tehran delayed the realization of the Zangezur Corridor and tried to exert pressure by conducting military exercises on the border with Azerbaijan. However, after a while, the country had to take a step back. The important factors in this were the Shusha Declaration between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the fact that Tehran’s aggressive policy could not find support from Russia and Iran being aware that pressure on Azerbaijan would not yield the desired result. Although the most recent visit of the Iranian foreign minister to Azerbaijan was positive, it is too early to assume stability has been achieved in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations.
Russia has to share its influence in the region with Türkiye in the post-Karabakh War period and is gradually losing its role as a stabilizing power following the Ukraine war. In the Russia-Ukraine War period, it lost its monopoly on the normalization process between Azerbaijan and Armenia to the West. This is also because proposals put forward by Russia were not accepted by either country. The presence of Russian peacekeeping troops in Karabakh does not satisfy either Azerbaijan or Armenia. Moreover, Ruben Vardanyan, sent to the region from Russia, is seen as an obstacle to integrating Karabakh Armenians with Azerbaijan. The support provided by Russian peacekeepers to separatists in the region continues to be harshly criticized by the Azerbaijani press and society.
After Azerbaijan’s Karabakh Victory, the West became more active in the region. Since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the importance of the region has increased in terms of energy and transportation projects, as well as security for the EU. Priorities of the West are ensuring the normalization process of Azerbaijan and Armenia under Western management, strengthening regional transport and energy connections, and isolating Russia from the region’s politics integrating the South Caucasus with the West.
However, we cannot say that the West has acted unilaterally in this regard. There are different approaches to this issue, and the French government, in particular, plays a spoiling role in regional politics.
In conclusion, the South Caucasus region is an important part of Eurasia in terms of its relations with Central Asia, Middle East and the West. A safe South Caucasus will ensure trade flow between East and West and foster global energy supply security along with the healthy functioning of north-south transportation routes. To ensure this, a peace agreement should be signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and all states of the region should cooperate within the framework of respect for mutual sovereignty and territorial integrity. The unfinished energy and transportation projects between the Türkiye-South Caucasus-Central Asia should be completed, and a South Caucasus-Central Asia platform can be established.
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The post South Caucasus after the two wars | Opinion first appeared on The News And Times – thenewsandtimes.com.
For nearly 25 years, traffic between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh traveled along a road known as the Lachin Corridor. It was constructed in 1998, shortly after Armenians won the territory in a war with Azerbaijan, and funded by Armenian diaspora members with money raised at a telethon. Since then, it has represented a critical lifeline for the Armenian residents of Karabakh.
On August 30 at 8 p.m., that road was closed, and traffic was immediately diverted to a new road roughly parallel to the old one, but slightly to the south. Called simply “the new road” by residents, this one has been constructed mostly by Azerbaijan, which retook the territory as part of the ceasefire agreement that ended the second war between the two sides in 2020.
The future of Armenians’ presence in Karabakh is precarious: Armenia appears to be heading toward signing a peace agreement that would cede control of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, which the current ethnic Armenian residents of the territory fear would lead to their ethnic cleansing.
For now, though, they have a new, modern road to travel between Armenia and Karabakh.
In a promotional video celebrating the construction by Azerbaijan’s state road agency, the narrator identified it as “the new highway that does not enter the city of Lachin.” That is the regional capital that the old road went through, and which Azerbaijan recently retook with great fanfare.
For the Armenian residents of Karabakh, the road remains their only outlet to Armenia and the outside world. While the initial reviews of the road have been good, there have been concerns about its safety as well: both about how easy it will be to drive in winter, and whether it will remain free from Azerbaijani control.
When Eurasianet’s correspondent recently traveled on the new road, much was familiar: Russian peacekeepers continued to operate as they had since 2020, checking travelers’ documents at their relocated checkpoints. Some Azerbaijani construction machinery was visible from the road, apparently erecting new Russian posts.
But the difference on the road itself was obvious. The new road is smoothly paved with gleaming new signs, a contrast to the old route that had become potholed from lack of maintenance. But it is also noticeably steeper in parts, with more turns, qualities that have concerned many drivers.
“There are too many turns and sharp rises. The old road was bumpy, but here the slopes are sharper and longer, and it’s not wide enough,” one taxi driver who regularly plies the route but did not want to be named told Eurasianet.
Some have worried that once winter arrives, the road may not be passable by ordinary cars.
“It seems like the winter will be difficult,” one driver told local news site 1lurer.am. “The road is not appropriate for cold weather, I am going to have to get a new car. I drive a taxi, and this road is not meant for cars like that, I will need a four-wheel drive,” another said.
Eurasianet’s source was not so sure. “It is dangerous in the winter, but if they plow the roads when it snows, it’s possible to manage it,” he said.
While the old road had a maximum grade of 17 percent, there are spots in the new road of up to 22 percent, said Mikael Nahapetyan, a senior member of the opposition Citizen’s Decision party.
He described the road as a dangerous “trap for Armenians” and criticized the local authorities for allowing the road to be constructed this way. “This actual ‘alternative’ road will deprive Artsakh of a stable and reliable connection with Armenia in the winter season,” he wrote in a Facebook post, using the Armenian name for Karabakh.
Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto Ministry of Urban Development assured residents that the road meets international standards and that it will maintain the road in order to guarantee safe transit even in winter. It noted that at some of the sharpest turns, a third lane has been added for safety.
Another concern is that one Azerbaijani military post has reportedly not been moved from the route of the new road. Although the ceasefire statement calls for the Russian peacekeepers to control a five-kilometer buffer around the road, a post near the village of Kirov (which Armenians call Hin Shen) lies only about 800 meters from the new road. There have been cases of rocks apparently being dropped from above on the cars traveling along the road, which locals blame on the Azerbaijani soldiers at the post, the community leader of Hin Shen, Samvel Sargsyan, told news site 1lurer.am.
But Sargsyan also said that the road could create new economic opportunities for Hin Shen and other communities along the new route.
The new route is not entirely complete. While the ceasefire agreement stipulated that a plan for a new road should have been formulated within three years, Azerbaijan had finished most of its section in a year and a half and began to pressure Armenia to speed up its section. An early August Azerbaijani offensive appeared motivated at least in part to force a quicker pace.
That month Armenia began construction of a 10-kilometer section on its territory, which will connect the new road from the Karabakh border to the current road at the village of Tegh. In order to speed up the adoption of the new road, Karabakh Armenians quickly constructed a five-kilometer temporary bypass road to use until the new road in Armenia is complete.
“While Azerbaijan has taken consistent and rapid steps to construct a new road that will contribute to the safe and peaceful coexistence of peoples, the Armenian side is prolonging the construction of the section passing through its territory without any reason,” one member of Azerbaijan’s parliament, Mazahir Efendiyev, told the state news agency Azertac.
Armenian officials argued that, according to the ceasefire agreement, they had three years to work out a plan for the construction with Azerbaijan. Following Azerbaijan’s August offensive along the Lachin Corridor, the Secretary of Armenia’s Security Council, Armen Grigoryan said that Azerbaijan’s demand to stop using the old road was not legitimate since “Armenia has not approved any plan.”
Less clear is the fate of another incomplete section closer to Stepanakert. One of the primary rationales of the new road was to bypass the city of Shusha, which the current road just skirts.
But the priority was the section of the new road that went around Lachin. To many Azerbaijanis, their country’s victory in the region appeared incomplete as long as they didn’t have control of these communities. Shortly after the 2020 ceasefire was signed, Aliyev highlighted the importance of regaining control of Lachin. “If Lachin … did not return to Azerbaijan, then there could be no agreement,” he said.
Correspondingly, the entry of Azerbaijani troops into Lachin on August 26 was widely celebrated in Azerbaijan.
There seems to be less urgency for a new road bypassing Shusha, though.
“For now there’s no precise plan for it,” one source in the de facto Karabakh government told Eurasianet on condition of anonymity. “The first part has been implemented but there are no discussions about the second part that will bypass Shushi [the Armenian name for the city]. It’s uncertain at the moment.”
The inauguration of the road comes as Armenians and Azerbaijanis are negotiating over another strategic road, connecting Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan to the rest of the country through Armenian territory. Azerbaijan has called the future road the “Zangezur Corridor,” and has argued that its legal arrangements should be identical to those on the Lachin Corridor.
The new road to Karabakh was “just a road, not a corridor” and that it will be part of the current negotiations over the other road, argued Azerbaijani military analyst Adalet Valiyev. “Its [the new Karabakh road’s] future status will be more related to the status given to Zangezur Corridor,” he told the news agency APA.
For their part, Armenians have rejected the comparison.
“The wording about the so-called corridor is unacceptable for us, and this is a red line for us, because in our region, according to the trilateral statement, we have one corridor, and this is the Lachin Corridor,” Pashinyan said in an interview with Al Jazeera on June 14.
The post Armenians warily travel along “the new road” to Karabakh first appeared on The News And Times – thenewsandtimes.com.
Azerbaijan has completed a new high-quality highway in its Karabakh and East Zangazur economic regions.
The new road bypasses Azerbaijan’s Lachin city and opens an all-new connection link between the Armenian-populated part of Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region and Armenia.
According to the State Agency of Azerbaijan Automobile Roads, ground was broken on the new highway, measuring 32 kilometers in total length, with 10 kilometers passing through Armenia’s territory, in July 2021.
The width of the carriageway, including three-lane on the slopes and two-lane on other sections, varies from 7 to 10.5 meters, and the roadway as a whole measure 12-15 meters. A four-span road bridge with a length of 149.5 meters and a width of 13.5 meters was built at the end of the 22nd kilometer of the road, where it will connect with the Armenian section.
The road is said to be fully operational in the Azerbaijani territory by August 25.
Meanwhile, Armenia is also expected to launch the 10-kilometre portion of the highway within its territory.
The Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of Armenia Gnel Sanosyan said Yerevan plans to complete the road’s construction sometime by the spring of 2023.
“The construction has started, the equipment is working, the road is being built,” Sanosyan said. “We have divided it into three parts and are actively working on it.”
Armenia and Azerbaijan had been at odds for several decades over the latter’s Karabakh (Garabagh) region. Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Armenia launched a military campaign against Azerbaijan that ended with a ceasefire deal in 1994. As a result of the bloody war, Armenia occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories. Over 30,000 Azerbaijanis were killed, and one million others were expelled from those lands in a brutal ethnic cleansing policy carried out by Armenia.
Lachin was occupied by the Armenian forces in 1992 leading to the forcible expulsion of ethnic Azerbaijanis living there.
Historically, the Azerbaijani region of Lachin was not populated by ethnic Armenians. The indigenous population of Lachin was comprised of ethnic Azerbaijanis. Ethnic Armenians were illegally settled there during years of Armenian occupation. According to Armenian data, a total of 180 ethnic Armenians currently live in Lachin.
On September 27, 2020, the decades-old conflict between the two countries took a violent turn after Armenia’s forces deployed in the occupied Azerbaijani lands shelled military positions and civilian settlements of Azerbaijan. During the counter-attack operations, Azerbaijani forces liberated over 300 settlements, including the cities of Jabrayil, Fuzuli, Zangilan, Gubadli, and Shusha, from a nearly 30-year-long illegal Armenian occupation. The war ended in a tripartite statement signed on November 10, 2020, by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. Under the statement, Armenia also returned the occupied Aghdam, Kalbajar, and Lachin districts to Azerbaijan.
However, the city of Lachin and two villages in the district remained along the Lachin corridor, which connects the Armenian-populated part of Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region with Armenia and is currently monitored by the Russian peacekeepers.
The new road will serve as an alternative to the Lachin corridor. It will shift the connection between Armenia and the Azerbaijani territories partially inhabited by ethnic Armenians from the traditional corridor to the new route and the city of Lachin will be returned to the control of the Azerbaijani authorities.
The post Azerbaijan Finishes Construction of New Highway Replacing Lachin Corridor first appeared on The News And Times – thenewsandtimes.com.
Beginning at 8 p.m. local time on Tuesday, the Lachin Corridor, which for more than three decades has served as the main artery connecting Armenia with Artsakh, will be permanently closed to Armenian travelers. Instead, a new temporary road that bypasses the Aghavno and Sus villages in Artsakh’s Berdzor region will begin operating and will be monitored by Russian peacekeepers.
An Azerbaijani destroying the Berdzor sign
The closure comes weeks after Azerbaijan launched an attack on Berdzor, killing two Artsakh soldiers, and effectively forcing the authorities of Armenia and Artsakh, as well as the Russian peacekeeping contingent to give in to its demands and occupy the region ahead of the timeline outlined by the November 9, 2020 agreement.
Artsakh’s Urban Development Minister Aram Sargsyan said that the 4.7-kilometer (2.9 miles) temporary road has already been paved, adding that some last-minute work is underway, such as drawing the traffic lines, reported Azatutyun.am’s Armenian Service.
The temporary road is slated to operate as “corridor.” The Russian peacekeeping leaders last week said that the new road will also have the legal status of a corridor.
According to Artsakh’s Interior Ministry spokesperson Hunan Tadevosyan, the Russian peacekeeping forces are currently finalizing their posts along the stretch of the road and will be ready by Tuesday.
The temporary road is expected to be used until the spring, when the construction of the new main road is expected to be completed.
Last week, Artsakh authorities announced that the Lachin corridor would remain open until the end of August 31. However, on Monday, the Artsakh Security Council decided to close that road earlier and reroute the traffic onto the temporary road.
Tadevosyan, the ministry spokesperson, said that there were no incidents during the past four days when there was simultaneous Azerbaijani and Armenian traffic.
Azerbaijanis entered Berdzor, Aghavno and Sus on Friday with loud fanfare. The first order of business for them was destroying the Berdzor sign and the entered Aghavno blasting Azerbaijani music. This was followed by a convoy Azerbaijani military personnel flooding the region, according to Azatutyun.am.
Azerbaijani military convoy enters Berdzor and Aghavno
The Russian peacekeeping forces have fortified their presence within Berdzor.
Locals reported to Azatutyun.am that there is heaving military presence in Aghavno. In Berdzor, where Armenian vehicles also travel, there are unarmed Azerbaijanis. In the city, however, power supply and other infrastructure management workers were observed.
“The road leading from the northern portion of Kashatagh to the south or from the southern section to the north passes through the Berdzor corridor. Many vehicles pass through there, as well as through the city of Berdzor, from the upper part to the lower part. Since they [the Azerbaijanis] just arrived, at the moment there are probably infrastructure repair efforts,” Tadevosyan told Azatutyun.am, adding that situation will continue until Tuesday evening. The temporary road bypassing the corridor enters Stepanakert through the Mets Shen village of Berdadzor and past Old Shen. The construction was carried out by the Azerbaijani side.
According to Davit Davtyan, the mayor of Mets Shen, there are no services for travelers in this section of the new corridor connecting Armenia with Artsakh.
The post Lachin Corridor Will Close to Armenians Tomorrow first appeared on The News And Times – thenewsandtimes.com.
